

Unbalanced Stability: Applying Lessons from American Cities in Stability Operations

A Monograph

By

**Mr. Ryan R. Poyant
U.S. Department of State**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 2011

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 11-05-2011			2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) JUL 2010 – MAY 2011	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Unbalanced Stability: Applying Lessons from American Cities in Stability Operations					5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
					5b. GRANT NUMBER	
					5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Mr. Ryan R. Poyant (U.S. Department of State)					5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
					5e. TASK NUMBER	
					5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth KS 66027-2134					8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Foreign Military Studies Office & Command and General Staff College Director, FMSO 731 McClellan Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350					10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) FMSO / CGSC	
					11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES						
14. ABSTRACT <p>Over the past decade, the United States has focused its military energy on the conduct of Stability Operations. The U.S. Department of Defense raised Stability Operations to the same level of importance as Offensive and Defensive Operations in 2005. The U.S. government has worked to integrate other national government agencies, as well as partner host nation agencies, into Stability Operations. Many cities in the United States suffer from threats that are similar to those faced in fragile states. These cities have been successful in deterring violence and achieving stability within violent neighborhoods. They used variations of the Broken Windows model of order maintenance. The Broken Windows model of order maintenance requires police foot patrols to pay attention to minor offenses and physical appearances of public property. The Broken Windows model attacks the perception of disorder. Utilizing an approach similar to the Broken Windows model in stability operations will decrease insurgent terrorist activity and increase a sense of connection to the government in transition. The outcomes of the Broken Windows model are the perception of security, a raised community maintenance standard, and a new definition of civility through self-policing. Applying a model of response in Stability Operations that draws on aspects of the Broken Windows model leads to sustainable development. The author will use vignettes from both in the United States and abroad to delineate the parallels between crime deterrence and Stability Operations. By using successful models of establishing order in urban regions in the United States, the U.S. government can better rationalize and institute Stability Operations abroad.</p>						
15. SUBJECT TERMS National Security Studies, Interagency Operations, Counterinsurgency, Stability Operations, Criminology, Unconventional Warfare, Public Administration, Peace Operations						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON	
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)	
			(U)	40		

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Mr. Ryan R. Poyant

Unbalanced Stability: Applying Lessons from American Cities in Stability Operations

Approved by:

Matthew Schmidt, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr., COL, IN

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

Disclaimer: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the US Army Command and General Staff College, the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Abstract

UNBALANCED STABILITY: APPLYING LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CITIES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS by Mr. Ryan R. Poyant, U.S. Department of State, 41 pages.

Over the past decade, the United States has focused its military energy on the conduct of Stability Operations. The U.S. Department of Defense raised Stability Operations to the same level of importance as Offensive and Defensive Operations in 2005. The U.S. government has worked to integrate other national government agencies, as well as partner host nation agencies, into Stability Operations. Many cities in the United States suffer from threats that are similar to those faced in fragile states. These cities have been successful in deterring violence and achieving stability within violent neighborhoods. They used variations of the Broken Windows model of order maintenance. The Broken Windows model of order maintenance requires police foot patrols to pay attention to minor offenses and physical appearances of public property. The Broken Windows model attacks the perception of disorder. Utilizing an approach similar to the Broken Windows model in stability operations will decrease insurgent terrorist activity and increase a sense of connection to the government in transition. The outcomes of the Broken Windows model are the perception of security, a raised community maintenance standard, and a new definition of civility through self-policing. Applying a model of response in Stability Operations that draws on aspects of the Broken Windows model leads to sustainable development. The author will use vignettes from both in the United States and abroad to delineate the parallels between crime deterrence and Stability Operations. By using successful models of establishing order in urban regions in the United States, the U.S. government can better rationalize and institute Stability Operations abroad.

Table of Contents

Unbalanced Stabilization: Introduction.....	1
The Broken Windows Approach.....	4
The Argument Against Broken Windows.....	11
Conflict Transformation and Stability Operations	13
Key Linkages: Crime and Instability.....	16
New York City, NY.....	19
Lowell, MA	22
The New Way Forward.....	26
United Nations Mission in Sudan.....	31
Conclusion.....	34
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	37

Unbalanced Stabilization: Introduction

This monograph seeks to answer whether or not the “Broken Windows” model of community policing and order maintenance could be incorporated into stability operations. It will do this by showing parallels between crime deterrence in the United States and stability operations used in conflict transformation.¹ By understanding domestic criminal deterrence techniques, military and civilian leaders can gain greater clarity on how to accomplish the tasks implicit in stability operations. The United States is involved in stability operations because the collapse of fragile states threatens the security of American citizens. When fragile states collapse, rapidly evolving terrorist structures, transnational crime, and ethnic violence threaten American citizens.² These groups complicate international relations and create regions of state fragility that present a grave threat to national security.³

“Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American people. To advance our common security, we must address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their borders and to be our partners in addressing common challenges.”⁴

United States Government (USG) elements abroad already have doctrine that calls for holistic operations, but they are not grounded in an overarching theory of conflict transformation. How can a strategy used in domestic order maintenance be used to guide stability operations? This is a question that

¹ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization U.S. Department of State, “Principles of the USG Planning Framework For Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation,” <http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=49Q9> (accessed February 26, 2011), 1. “Conflict Transformation” is achieving change in a specified country or region undergoing or projected to undergo violent conflict or civil strife. The goal is to reach the point where the country or region is on a sustainable positive trajectory, where it is able to address on its own the dynamics causing civil strife and/or violent conflict. This requires simultaneously supporting sources of social and institutional resilience as well as other factors that mitigate civil strife and violent conflict while reducing the drivers of conflict and other factors that continue or escalate violent conflict or civil strife. One fundamental principle of conflict transformation is that, over the longer term, the host nation must develop its own capacity to ensure stability and conditions for economic growth – those conditions cannot be imposed from outside. They must be developed and grown from within.

² U.S. Department of Defense. *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-10. The term “fragile state” is a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. These weaknesses arise from several root causes, including ineffective governance, criminalization of the state, economic failure, external aggression, and internal strife due to disenfranchisement of large sections of the population.

³ Ibid, 1-2 - 1-3.

⁴ Barack Obama, “2010 National Security Strategy,” The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed December 13, 2010), 26.

links stability operations with domestic policing. “The common denominator that clearly defines gangs as mutations of insurgents is the irrevocable need to depose or control an incumbent government to force a radical socio-economic political restructuring of the nation-state and its governance.”⁵

The Broken Windows model argues communities gain security and stability by using police foot patrols within communities. The Broken Windows model is derived from James Q. Wilson’s criminological theory that the main mission of police forces is to maintain order.⁶ Police foot patrols pay attention to minor offenses and physical appearances of public property. The changed appearances and increased surveillance reduces fear, strengthens communities, and prevents serious crimes.⁷ Communities perceive a decrease in crime and trust their community police force. If used in stability operations, the Broken Windows model will decrease insurgent terrorist activity and increase a sense of connection to the affected government in transition. Broken Windows-like techniques increase a perception of security, raise community maintenance standards, and define civility through self-policing.

The modern challenges that the USG faces in conducting stability operations are not new phenomena. From the Civil War Reconstruction Period to current operations in the Middle East, the USG has been employed in conflict transformation and sustainable development. The United States has historically recognized the benefits of standing up stable administrative structures in post-conflict environments. For example, Robert Lee Bullard, an American General who was raised in the Reconstruction South, led stability operations in the Philippines and commanded a division as a part of the American Expeditionary Force in World War I. He exemplified the varied role of the American Soldier as “peacemaker and peace-preserver” through his personal experiences living under occupation

⁵ Max G. Manwaring, “Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency,” Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB597.pdf> (accessed December 8, 2010), 33.

⁶ James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 4.

⁷ Anthony A. Braga and Brenda Bond. “Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial.” *Criminology* 46, no. 3 (September 2008): 577-607. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2008.00124.x> (accessed August 4, 2010), 578.

and conducting both stability and offensive operations.⁸ As General Bullard said a hundred years ago, “Pacification regularly ends, consummates, and crowns the work of war, and he who makes one properly also makes the other.”⁹

Presently, there are varying agencies, bureaus, and programs within the USG that attempt to manage stability operations. There requires a simultaneous effort between military and civilian agencies.¹⁰ Agency representatives, be it military or civilian, conducting stability operations independently will not achieve the simultaneity required for success. “Military forces help to set the conditions that enable the actions of the other instruments of national power to succeed in achieving the broad goals of conflict transformation.”¹¹

This monograph first discusses the Broken Windows model and examples of its implementation in the United States. New York City, NY and Lowell, MA are two cities where the Broken Windows model was applied in police operations. In both cases, open collaboration between the communities and their police forces reduced the opportunity for crime. Both communities and their police forces held each other accountable. In time, the prospect developed for community stabilization and the reclamation of neighborhoods from criminal elements. These communities set standards under which they policed themselves and maintained their own order. Valuable government resources were reallocated to other agencies in need.

This monograph then provides examples where Broken Windows-like techniques are being used by military forces conducting stability operations in fragile states. The first example is the change in strategy by the American forces in Iraq that led to “The New Way Forward.” The second example is the efforts of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan where they assisted the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudan’s Peoples Liberation Movement and the

⁸ Robert Bullard: “Military Pacification.” *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* 46, no. 163 (January – February 1910), 1.

⁹ Ibid, 2.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense. *Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, 1-3. Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense. *Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, 2-2.

Government of Sudan. In both cases, there were international military forces that implemented elements of Broken Windows in affected areas. One shows elements of a holistic community maintenance effort by having security forces live in the communities being affected by criminal elements. The other lacked holistic integration of agencies and only implemented community police training. Both attempted to have communities perceive an integration of efforts between host government and foreign forces.

Finally, this monograph will conclude with a discussion on the parallels between current stability operations and the Broken Windows approach to order maintenance. The parallels will be evaluated based on two criteria: simultaneity and trust. Simultaneity depends on depth to attain lasting effects and maximum synergy. Simultaneous combinations of tasks overwhelm enemy forces. Simultaneous actions across the depth of the operational area place more demands on enemy forces than can be responded to. Operations using simultaneity paralyzes enemy forces and induces their early culmination. Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent effects operations produce at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.¹² Trust refers to the legitimacy of the unity of command between civilian and military forces in an operational area in order to mitigate friction associated with operations in and among the local populace. Trust also refers to the legitimacy of the host nation government in the eyes of a local population.¹³ The findings of this monograph seek to link crime and terror. Then it will show that the same techniques used against crime in the United States can be successful in stability operations.

The Broken Windows Approach

In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling used the metaphor of a broken window in a neighborhood to describe the relationship between disorder and crime. “If a window in a building is broken *and is left unrepaired*, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. . . . [O]ne unrepaired

¹² U.S. Department of Defense. *Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 6-16, 6-17.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense. *Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, 1-7. Legitimacy is central to building trust and confidence among the people.

broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.”¹⁴ If a piece of property is left neglected and broken by its owner, the surrounding community will also neglect it and actually make it worse through breaking other parts. The broken window metaphor helps municipal police departments define and maintain order with the communities they serve. Crime fighting or individual criminal activities no longer become the sole effort of a police force. Rather, the police force works with a community to determine what they must do together to dilute communal fear.

According to the Department of Justice, community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies across the spectrum of nongovernment, business, and government organizations. Community policing supports the regular use of partnerships to solve problems. Community policing proactively addresses the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.¹⁵ It is a “whole of community” approach, incorporating all elements of a given community, to address the needs of a community through creating partnerships, effective administrative management, and problem solving.¹⁶ Community policing strives to create a positive climate where state and municipal employees from differing agencies can collaborate and coordinate to solve community problems. This includes all departments and agencies working in a community: public works, education, highway, health, human services, recreation, and transportation departments.¹⁷ It

¹⁴ George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, “The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” *The Atlantic Magazine*, March 1982, 29-38.

¹⁵ United States Department of Justice. *Community Policing Defined*. (Washington, DC: Community Oriented Policing Services, 2009), 3.

¹⁶ Wesley G. Skogan, “Broken Windows: Why – And How – We Should Take Them Seriously.” *Criminology & Public Policy* 7, no. 2 (May 2008), 197-199.

¹⁷ Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service*, 30th Anniversary Expanded Edition, 30 Anv Exp ed. (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010), 3-4. The public servants from the state and municipal agencies who interact directly with citizens are called street-level bureaucrats. Police officers, fire fighters, teachers, health, and human services employees make up the bulk of the street-level bureaucratic ranks. The relationships and connections that citizens build with their government are based upon their regular interaction with these professionals. Generally, street-level bureaucrats are professionals with public expectations and their execution of their daily duties create a perception of a government’s efficiency and quality. This perception is a condition that the community as a whole operates under. Street-level bureaucrats usually are representative of the communities they serve and implicitly mediate aspects of the constitutional relationship of citizens to the state by determining the eligibility of government’s benefits and sanctions through their personal, situational discretion.

removes self-imposed barriers and “stove-pipes” of effort in solving community problems.¹⁸

Community-based policing, prosecution, and probation are designed to build a sense of security through providing neighborhoods with the responsibility of involvement in the problem solving apparatus.

Community policing seeks to establish the condition of order in a community through deploying police patrolmen that use personal discretion to enforce what is “right” or “seemly” conduct over what is unseemly behavior. The standards are established by “the public”: onlookers, neighbors, or the community at large.¹⁹ Infractions of community standards may not be breakages of the law that are arrest worthy, but they change the condition of order, creating disorder. Order is defined as the “absence of disorder.”²⁰ Disorder means the “behavior that either disturbs or threatens to disturb the public peace or that involves face-to-face conflict among two or more persons.”²¹ Activities such as public drunkenness, public urination, and panhandling are examples of disorderly behavior that change the condition in a community where a patrolman would be asked to put a stop to. An incident is defined as “an occurrence of an action or situation that is a separate unit of experience.”²² In law enforcement, the incident is the actual breaking of the law where the patrolman responds to a crime scene or apprehends someone suspected of committing a crime. With incidents, blame is at issue and will be determined when the apprehended criminal is judged before a jury of his peers in a court of law over the events that took place when the incident occurred. With incidents, the patrolman is reactive because there was a clear infraction that broke the law and the patrolman responded to a call for help. In establishing a condition, patrolmen provide a peaceful environment for communities to conduct their daily activities through proactive community engagement with business owners, law abiding residents, and potential threats.

An example of how community policing works can be seen in the “Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program” developed by the Police Foundation in the 1970’s. This was a state run

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ James Q. Wilson, 16.

²⁰ James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 16.

²¹ Ibid, 16.

²² *Merriam-Webster*, s.v. “Incident,” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incident> (accessed November 16, 2010).

program being executed in 28 cities of New Jersey. It provided state money to municipal police budgets that mandated that police officers walk certain neighborhood beats instead of driving through them in their squad cars. Senior police leaders in New Jersey municipalities were unhappy about this due to their belief that their departments would not be able to respond to incidents as quickly due to reduced mobility. Walking beats also reduced command and control from headquarters to the foot patrolling officers. Many municipal police officers disliked this program due to the fact that beat walking in many police department cultures were used as a form of punishment²³. Within municipal governments, budgets must balance. Therefore, revenue constraints drive the municipal decision making process²⁴. In these twenty eight communities, this money was readily accepted and the program was put to work.

After its completion, the Police Foundation conducted a study concluding that there was no significant drop in crime²⁵. But in the areas where the foot patrols occurred, the study found that citizens had a more favorable opinion of the police as well as feeling more secure inside their neighborhoods. Police who walked neighborhood beats reported higher morale and better outlook towards their designated communities²⁶. There was an increase in the positive relationships between residents and police as well as an increased sense of security. Attitudes about crime and neighborhood livability had changed²⁷. Listed are the findings of the study:

- Residents knew when officers were patrolling their neighborhoods on foot.
- Residents in areas patrolled by officers on foot thought that crime was less of a problem than did residents in areas with only motorized patrol.
- Residents in areas with foot patrol felt safer and less likely to be victimized.
- Residents living in areas with foot patrol took fewer steps to protect themselves against crime.
- Residents in areas with foot patrol were more satisfied with police services²⁸

²³ George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, 29-38.

²⁴ Gerasimos A. Gianakis and Clifford P. McCue, *Local Government Budgeting: A Managerial Approach* (Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1999), 4.

²⁵ George L. Kelling et al., "The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment," Police Foundation, <http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/newark.html> (accessed December 8, 2010).

²⁶ George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, 29-38.

²⁷ George L. Kelling et al., "The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment," Police Foundation, <http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/newark.html> (accessed December 8, 2010).

²⁸ Ibid.

Disorder is defined as “the condition and event widely interpreted as signaling a breakdown in the realization of conventional norms about public behavior.”²⁹ The presence of disorder includes both visual signs of physical decline and the behavioral evidence of social disorganization. “Junk and trash in vacant lots, poor maintenance of homes, boarded-up buildings, vandalism of public and private property, graffiti, and the presence of stripped and abandoned cars in the streets and alleys” all signal disorder is present in a community.³⁰ The other part of disorder in communities is the behavioral evidence of social disorganization that is “signaled by bands of teenagers congregating on street corners, public solicitation for prostitution, begging, public drinking, verbal harassment of women on the street, and open gambling and drug use.”³¹ Many of the items mentioned are not serious crimes in and of themselves. But when they are integrated all at once into particular communities, these activities establish a reputation that, Wilson and Kelling argue, attract criminals due to the potential opportunities for crime they offer. Wilson and Kelling connect disorderly behavior and fear.³² Community policing programs assuage the community’s worry about soft crime and physical decay. Foot patrols elevate the level of public order in neighborhoods, establishing a link between order-maintenance and neighborhood livability.

When executing the Broken Windows model, government leaders must seek out community leaders with the capacity to influence targeted populations. Although there are elected officials who may represent the needs of a given population in a body of government, there are other community leaders that can better persuade citizens. Some of these people are known criminals or hard-liners that sway peers towards crime, terrorism, and violence. These are people that cannot be swayed towards civil reform. However, there are others in the same communities whom have equal legitimacy that can provide a positive influence. These same people have legitimate links to security and government leaders. These

²⁹ Wesley G. Skogan. “Disorder, Crime and Community Decline.” In Tim Hope and Margaret Shaw (eds.) *Communities and Crime Reduction*. (London: HMSO, 1988), 48. Wesley Skogan is a Northwestern University professor whose research focuses on the interface between the public and the legal system in crime prevention and community-oriented policing.

³⁰ Ibid, 48.

³¹ Ibid, 48.

³² George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, 20.

people were dubbed as “brokers” by Ronald Teachman, Chief of Police for the City of New Bedford, MA.³³

Brokers are those who have influence inside target communities and link at risk communities to the government. They provide community “buy in” to government propositions due to their previously established trust and authority. For example, clergy leaders have implied social stature in a religious community due to their stature in their churches. If a policy was to affect children, the first set of leaders that policy makers reach out to is teachers. Teachers influence parents and children through their authority provided by the community to educate and raise the standard of living of future generations. Another group of community leaders are found in neighborhood associations. Neighborhood associations have leaders that are regularly engaged with their communities. Finally, ex-convicts and previous criminal offenders are also leaders in communities due to their street credentials and reputation. They can influence criminal populations and deter future crime through conveying their experiences. Through brokers, trust is already established and does not have to be recreating relationships. Brokers allow policy makers and government officials the opportunity to quicken the consensus building process when conducting their daily business.³⁴

Outside of premade relationships, brokers provide a key service that is easily transferable into military stability operations. Brokers provide intelligence through their legitimacy. Brokers provide initial intelligence assessments for security forces due to their cultural deference and inclusivity. When security forces and government leaders have greater knowledge of the areas they hope to influence, they conduct operations that are data driven, predictive, and legitimate due to the inherent authority and support from the brokers.³⁵

In the 1960’s, there was a role change for police departments throughout the country due to crime waves. Attention shifted from an order maintenance function to an effort to solve crimes, make arrests, and gather better evidence. While making the transition, the function of order maintenance was

³³ Ronald Teachman Interview, (November 24, 2010).

³⁴ Ronald Teachman Interview, (November 24, 2010).

³⁵ Ronald Teachman Interview, (November 24, 2010).

remembered but the link between order maintenance and crime prevention was lost.³⁶ A Broken Windows-like strategy expands the mission set of police beyond the culture of crime fighting. Police officers simultaneously work with affected communities, conduct investigations, and make arrests.

In Broken Windows-like operations, municipal success is judged by simultaneous activity across the spectrum of agencies and the trust that is developed. Normally, simultaneity contradicts traditional competition that agencies have in a municipality. “The fragmented structure of local government militates against the efficient production of essential public services.” In the United States, municipal agencies, much like federal agencies, compete with one another to affect changes in their budgets through developing constituencies that will influence the yearly allocation process that determines the scope of their programs throughout the course of the year. A governing body that is elected with the power to allocate resources to government agencies has “allocative efficiency”, which is in direct competition with “technological efficiency”.³⁷ If the agency is found to be too technically proficient in providing services, either through coordinating with partner agencies or creating internal efficiencies, it will have left over resources that will be re-allocated to other priorities. Therefore, street-level bureaucrats have little incentive to work with each other and create efficiencies internally because their budgets will be cut. These budgeting practices promote spending resources without providing incentives for using them in the best way to create value. Bureaucratic competition does not occur in an American vacuum, but is inherent in bureaucratic administration throughout the world.

Street-level bureaucrats move beyond these challenges to add value to their communities regardless of the challenges. Simultaneity of action overwhelms criminal elements causing disorder in a community. Trust develops by communities responding to the tasks. Trust is judged by communities requesting help and collaborating with street level bureaucrats. Trust removes the opportunity for criminals to operate openly in a community.

³⁶ George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, 29-38.

³⁷ Gerasimos A. Gianakis and Clifford P. McCue, *Local Government Budgeting: A Managerial Approach* (Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1999), 65,69.

The Argument Against Broken Windows

Broken Windows-like techniques in policing are still controversial. The model is difficult to independently verify and has been prone to attack by academics. This is mostly due to three causes: implementation, perception, and changing demographics.³⁸ Over use of the police force without coordinating a strategy with other municipal agencies, nonprofit organizations, and communities turns many Broken Windows-like techniques into “zero tolerance” enforcement. Zero tolerance is a solutions focused idea of focusing efforts on low-level crime and disorder through aggressive and uncompromising law enforcement.³⁹ When the Broken Windows approach is indiscriminately applied with no exceptions, various populations will be discriminated against. Discrimination ranges from the poor, minorities, and the mentally ill. A negative perception develops with a message that the government is attacking these populations. Trust does not develop because the police and communities do not coordinate.

Charles Pollard, former Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police in Great Britain, believes “zero tolerance” policing is the result of implementing Broken Windows-like techniques. Pollard says Broken Windows-like techniques produce short term outcomes. He cites the independent use of combative police tactics as the implementation of the Broken Windows model. These tactics have beat officers use stop-and-frisk searches on anyone deemed a threat. Other tactics include arresting anyone who cannot account for being in a targeted neighborhood. These are tactics that create an overly combative police management environment. The results alienate a community from the police.⁴⁰

Implementation style and community perception are important. Pollard believes that when the Broken Windows model is implemented, there is little emphasis placed on collaboration and partnership between municipal government agencies (education, health, parks). Rather, emphasis in partnership was on other law enforcement partners such as prosecutors, courts, and prisons.⁴¹ Pollard names organizational culture within the bureaucracy as the culprit: the “values and systems ... do not support ...

³⁸Charles Pollard, ed., “Zero Tolerance: Short-term Fix, Long-term Liability?” in *Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society (Choice in Welfare, No 35)*, 2 ed., ed. Norman Dennis (London: Coronet Books, 1998), 47.

³⁹ Ibid, 47.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 45.

⁴¹ Ibid, 45.

a community style of policing.”⁴² The outcome of regularly implementing aggressive policing tactics on at-risk communities is further alienation of your target community. The community’s trust in police is lowered, directly affecting the integrity of the government as a whole.

Dr. Bernard Harcourt, from the University of Chicago, states that Broken Windows policing focuses police officers on minor disorders. “The real problem is that order-maintenance crackdowns are not an *alternative* but rather an *addition* to the severe penalties that dominate criminal justice.”⁴³ Through a false promise of order maintenance, severe punishments are filling prisons throughout the country with minor offenders and ordinary citizens with a focus on minority populations.⁴⁴ A rapid increase in the amount of police officers on the beat, changes in drug usage, and the decline in the number of eighteen to twenty-four year old males were all factors in the decline of crime in New York that were not taken into account within studies as of 2001⁴⁵. Harcourt implicated multiple factors that were involved with the vast reduction in criminal activity in the 1990’s. The reintegration of beat cops on the streets armed with new tactics and instantaneous neighborhood intelligence reduced crime. A hierarchy that coordinated operations in tandem with partner agencies and community organizations was a factor in crime reduction. Dr. Bernard Harcourt believes that these changes are not involved in the Broken Windows model. Therefore, the Broken Windows model was not the determining factor.⁴⁶

Both Harcourt and Pollack are correct in their belief that law enforcement agencies alone will not restore order. Zero tolerance policing tactics targeted at minor crimes threatens the very order the police hope to maintain. They are correct in saying that using zero tolerance policing tactics is a short term fix. However, both Harcourt and Pollack are shortsighted in their view that the Broken Windows model is limited to merely the zero tolerance policing tactics. They never account for the community’s change in perception when the Broken Windows model was implemented. The perception shift could only occur

⁴² Ibid, 55.

⁴³ Bernard E. Harcourt, *Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 6.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 6.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 9.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 10.

through the very collaboration that they advocate. The Broken Windows model requires leadership to reach out to other agencies and build community partnerships. Only simultaneous activities will allay the impact of tougher policing tactics. Trust develops through the relationship between community and government.

Conflict Transformation and Stability Operations

Stability operations “leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.”⁴⁷ The Department of Defense issued Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 establishing stability operations as a core Department of Defense mission in 2005. No longer would stability operations be considered secondary to offensive and defensive operations.

*Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.*⁴⁸

Through DODD 3000.05, military doctrine firmly placed stability operations within full spectrum operations, the U.S. Army’s operational concept. Full spectrum operations recognizes holistic combat through integrating the elements of offense, defense, and stability into simultaneous operations in order to achieve, retain, and exploit initiative in lethal and nonlethal operational environments.⁴⁹ The mission determines the weight of the elements in full spectrum operations. Soldiers are required to become experts in combined arms maneuver (offense and defense) and in wide area security (stability). Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, recognizes stability operations as a requirement for creating opportunity for successful completion of offensive and defensive operations. LTG Bullard would recognize the Army’s current operational concept.

⁴⁷ United States Department of Defense. *Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, 2-2.

⁴⁸ Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005).

⁴⁹ United States Department of Defense. *Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, 3-1.

Conflict transformation is raised as a guiding principle for US policy makers to transition away from violent means towards long term peaceful resolution of problem solving.⁵⁰ Conflict transformation is a term that gained acceptance within the field of conflict resolution in the middle of the 1990's and became a sub-section of it.⁵¹ Dr. Louise Diamond, cofounder of the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy, states that conflict transformation is a community based activity that seeks to change the root cause of violence and root out future conflict.⁵² Dr. Diamond provides this definition to broadly explain community oriented resolution of violence between adversaries. However, he states that government can be involved in conflict transformation but is not the main actor. US Army doctrine adapted these definitions for their stability operations by stating conflict transformation is “the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations.”⁵³ Community oriented conflict resolution provided through simultaneous government activity drives American doctrine.

The US military refined its doctrine to take into account the multiple stakeholders that affect a given battlefield. In Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, Soldiers engage and win combat engagements. But in order for those engagements to be decisive, Soldiers must shape civil conditions in order to exploit their engagements for long term success.⁵⁴ American military doctrine recognizes the need to conduct regular civic engagements with business leaders, host nation civil authorities, adversaries, multinational partners, and other civilian authorities (tribal, nonprofit organizations, etc.).⁵⁵ Soldiers must simultaneously combine offensive and defensive operations with stability operations in order to gain the suitable conditions for conflict transformation.

⁵⁰ United States Institute of Peace and U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 3-12.

⁵¹ James Notter, “Occasional Paper: Trust and Conflict Transformation,” Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, http://imtd.server295.com/?page_id=347 (accessed November 30, 2010).

⁵² Louise Diamond, “Conflict Resolution Terminology,” Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, http://imtd.server295.com/?page_id=647 (accessed November 30, 2010).

⁵³ United States Department of Defense. *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, Glossary-4.

⁵⁴ United States Department of Defense. *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, 3-2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 3-2.

When offensive and defensive operations are no longer the weighted components in full spectrum operations, the Department of State provides five broad stability sectors, or lines of effort, that guide all USG agencies in stability: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure.⁵⁶ There are three essential tasks that are derived from within five of these sectors that the military has primary responsibility for: civil security, civil control, and essential services.⁵⁷ The other two tasks are support to governance and support to economic and infrastructure development. These last two are conducted by interagency partners under a coordinated strategy. All five tasks are to be executed simultaneously for them to be sustainable.

US military units tasked with establishing civil security are responsible for providing the safety of civilian populations.⁵⁸ This is done through disarming former adversaries, protecting key leaders, protecting facilities, and assuming a temporary police role. Providing civil control overlaps with civil security through the policing role. Civil control regulates behavior and provides the public order of civil society. This task includes developing a host nation's security forces, from municipal police training and reform to military transformation. As host nation's forces are built up, they then partner with USG forces and relieve USG forces as conflict transformation occurs. In restoring essential services, the military is responsible for providing the initial response to civilian needs. Follow on support from interagency partners and host nation experts provide the long term infrastructure, economic, and governance development. The military typically uses SWEAT-MSO as an acronym to remember their activities under this task: sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations.⁵⁹ During these tasks, US military forces integrate the principles of community policing into training host

⁵⁶ United States Department of Defense. *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, 2-5.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 3-2.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 2-9.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 3-2 - 3-9.

nation security forces.⁶⁰ Civilian populations abroad benefit from the tactics used in domestic policing in the United States through US military doctrine.

The Key Linkages: Crime and Instability

How are techniques used in domestic order maintenance be used in conflict transformation? This question links stability operations with domestic policing. In the United States, gangs can form, recruit, and congregate without breaking the law.⁶¹ When the Broken Windows approach is applied, police and communities deter gang violence by removing the opportunity for gangs to conduct criminal activities. Coordinated activity disorients both gang and insurgent resistance.⁶² In conducting stability operations in fragile states abroad, the military force gains initiative by combining shock and relief to targeted populations.⁶³ Initiative is required in both crime deterrence and stability operations.

Dr. Max G. Manwaring from the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College relates gang violence to violence waged by insurgents. This violence directly affects stability operations. Dr. Manwaring links insurgency with third generation gangs. Third-generation gangs are the most complex on a scale of gangs developed by John P. Sullivan from the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. Sullivan states gangs evolve over a continuum from first to third. First-generation gangs are local street gangs that protect immediate neighborhoods where they operate. First-generation gang activities are limited in scope and occur when opportunity allows. Second-generation gangs are business focused and entrepreneurial in the drug trade. They are multi-state and international actors that have centralized and sophisticated operations, utilizing violence for market protection. Finally, third-generation gangs have political aims and include first and second gang characteristics but actively seek to infiltrate legal political and bureaucratic entities. They are no longer simply sophisticated market driven criminal businesses, but complex international actors that are conducting political, social, and mercenary activities to support their

⁶⁰ Ibid, 2-10.

⁶¹ George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, 29-38.

⁶² United States Department of Defense. *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, 2-3.

⁶³ Ibid, 2-3.

long term commercial objectives.⁶⁴ Third-generation gangs wage a version of non-state war involving both criminals and terrorists. They struggle against each other and a host government to exploit relative advantages using insurgent methods for both commercial and political ends.⁶⁵ When looking at the nature of gangs and insurgents, they have a common ultimate objective: the seizure of power to govern in a given area (turf).⁶⁶ This control can be in a failed state, in a failed community, or failed neighborhood. Both are cousins that have differing motives for power. Where gangs are largely commercial and insurgents are largely political, they both seek the same outcomes through similar techniques: community intimidation and violence. Dr. Manwaring utilizes the “Duck Analogy” to link gangs and insurgents: if third generation gangs “look like ducks, walk like ducks, and act like ducks – a peculiar breed, but ducks nevertheless!”⁶⁷

If both organizations utilize similar techniques at the local level, can activities that are successful against gangs be equally successful against insurgents? Both gangs and insurgents flourish in regions where governance administrative structures are either weak or nonexistent. Their effects are most forcefully felt at the street-level, where the relationships between groups are characterized by violence and competition. Therefore, their behavior can be affected by “manipulating societal and local-level factors ... [r]esolving critical shortages and introducing balanced state-led reforms in the formal sector will slow or reverse the growth of the informal and shadow economies.”⁶⁸ The problems of crime and insurgency require similar holistic government engagement in order to displace potential violent actors from conducting their operations.

Dr. Manwaring agrees with the premise of a Broken Windows-like approach. Holistic engagement using both military and civilian agencies available working simultaneously against gangs will

⁶⁴ John P. Sullivan, “Transnational Gangs: The Impact of Third Generation Gangs in Central America,” *Air and Space Power Journal*, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apjs/2008/2tri08/sullivaneng.htm#Sullivan> (accessed December 8, 2010).

⁶⁵ Max G. Manwaring, “Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency,” *Army War College Strategic Studies Institute*, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB597.pdf> (accessed December 8, 2010), 4-5.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶⁸ Nicholas I. Haussler, “Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 97, in *Air University*, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/haussler_gangs_iraq.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).

provide positive outcomes in reducing gang violence. Non-state conflict is a complex problem and cannot be waged by either a strictly police or military force alone.⁶⁹ Holistic government engagement jumpstarts civil society's trust because the populations affected by both the government and criminal activities are presented with a complete authority a community can engage with. Only when a government provides order through integrated activity that is organized around a single strategy is stability operations sustainable. Balanced action undercuts street-level mobilization against the government that fuels insurgency.⁷⁰ Total community presence promotes the safe environment for markets to reopen and legitimate commerce to flourish.

Sullivan's arguments align with the Broken Windows approach, but he expands it to encompass agreement between international government and non-government actors. "Cooperation is required at both diplomatic (state-to-state) and sub-national (city-to-city) levels and among professional organizations."⁷¹ Police in a host nation should be visible within a community. At all levels, police must be engaged with community leaders and building trust with the civilian population.⁷² Broken Windows-like techniques can be applied by transferring its concepts to the state under conflict transformation. Host nation law enforcement agencies suffering from instability must partner with the diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic powers of the country supporting the anti-gang activities.⁷³ This leverages all agencies involved in foreign policy to engage gang violence and protect citizens. Since there is a relationship between gangs and insurgents within unstable countries, then interagency collaboration will be effective in conducting stability operations against insurgents.

⁶⁹ Manwaring, 5.

⁷⁰ Haussler, 97.

⁷¹ John P. Sullivan.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

New York City, NY

New York has a population of over 8 million people concentrated in 350 square miles and organized into 76 police precincts⁷⁴. In 1994, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani hired William Bratton, the former New York City Transit Police Chief, to become the Police Commissioner after his success in implementing the Broken Windows approach to order maintenance within the city's subway system. Although there is much that can be discussed on the effects of implementing Broken Windows within New York City, this section will address how Commissioner Bratton reorganized his bureaucracy to engender personal responsibility, empower subordinates, and collaborate with partner municipal agencies.

Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, the professionalization of policing occurred. New York police officers worked within a centralized organization summed up by three R's: Rapid Response, Random Patrol, and Reactive Investigation⁷⁵. Rapid Response policing developed with the appearance and rapid utilization of the 911 emergency contact number that spread throughout the United States. Police departments focused their attention on how quick their response time was to those calls for help. Random patrols occurred when police officers were not responding to emergency calls. Officers were assigned a sector of a community to patrol within their vehicle at random to deter criminal activity. There was no formal targeting process. Finally, reactive investigation was the movement during the professionalization period that vastly improved the criminal investigation process. The element that linked these three R's together was the fact that they were all reactionary⁷⁶. This is the period where success in crime fighting was assessed by the amount of arrests made in a given period, a general intolerance of citizen involvement, and an insistence that such matters be left to the professionals⁷⁷. This was the culture in the New York Police Department that Commissioner Bratton was hired to change.

⁷⁴ William J. Bratton, "Cutting Crime and Restoring Order: What America Can Learn from New York's Finest," The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/HL573nbsp-Cutting-Crime-and-Restoring-Order> (accessed January 30, 2011), 11.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 3.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 3.

⁷⁷ George L. Kelling and Catherine Coles, 156.

Since the 1960's, disorder became the standard in many public areas within New York. Squeegeeing, panhandling, and other petty crimes created a pervasive criminal environment in the city. Many police officers believed these crimes to be beneath the "dignity of self-respecting police [officers]"⁷⁸. Along with this general disorder, violent crime was going up throughout this period because of the lack of societal control over the city. Peaceful citizens were losing their communities due to drug dealers and gun toting youths claiming them as turf to protect for their gangs. The main cause of serious crime was due to the sale and use of illegal drugs⁷⁹. There was an editorial outcry in the media and a generally accepted notion that something had to be done. It had to be led by municipal government.⁸⁰

Commissioner Bratton decided to implement his problem-oriented policing strategy in a similar fashion to that espoused by the US Army's "Mission Command" template. Mission Command is the decentralized execution of mission orders through subordinate leaders exercising disciplined initiative within a commander's intent⁸¹. Commissioner Bratton saw the police department as a centralized bureaucracy that became over specialized, where the specialists were not communicating with each other. The first key activity was to decentralize control and provide authority to the precinct commanders, empowering them to assign officers as they pleased, based on the fears expressed by community members during outreach meetings with neighborhood associations. Next, Bratton created the culture of information sharing and inclusion within the police bureaucracy. Bratton opened up information databases that were previously off limits to detectives and mid-level managers. He treated police officers as professionals. Bratton decentralized control through empowering responsibilities in subordinates and ensuring greater police collaboration⁸². Bratton ensured greater assessment and accountability measures through the implementation of COMPSTAT⁸³. Bratton's reforms treated

⁷⁸ Ibid, 138.

⁷⁹ William J. Bratton, 12.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 9.

⁸¹ U.S. Department of Defense. *U.S. Army Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003), 1-17.

⁸² William J. Bratton, 10-19.

⁸³ Ibid, 16. COMPSTAT is a system developed by Commissioner Bratton in 1994 in order to attain daily crime statistics within New York City. It was also a weekly information sharing and operational management

policing like preemptive medicine, where police officers use preventive measures to ensure the health of the community. In this case, the community has a malaria outbreak and is full of mosquitos that are passing the disease and must work together to drain the swamp.⁸⁴

Simultaneously, Bratton attained political support from the mayor to help in coordinating all activities of the city's agencies. There were quality-of-life issues that ranged beyond the police department's purview that generate fear. By linking the activities of the partner agencies, the whole city government is involved in removing the visible signs of disorder and providing social support for those in need⁸⁵. The idea of partnership and collaboration between agencies is difficult due to the territorial nature of bureaucratic management. Over specialization and centralization slow hamper collaboration.

By empowering precinct commanders, removing unneeded specialized units, and collaborating with the city government, the NYPD was able to significantly reduce the crime rate. The murder rate in 1994 was significantly less than the national average⁸⁶. As Bratton's successor, Commissioner Howard Safir noted:

"I think ... you have to have information, you have to be able to computerize your information so that you can meet with your local commanders, and then hold them accountable for what you do. Then the most important other thing is to hold people accountable and measure success not by arrests but by crime reduction. Here in New York we don't measure success of our commanders by the number of arrests they make. We measure success by the number of crime complaints they reduce. And I think by applying business principles to crime reduction and managing crime, instead of letting crime manage you, you end up with the kind of reductions that we've seen here in New York. Accountability and responsibility is probably the key to making sure that police departments are effective."⁸⁷

New York City police officers integrated with the community and reported their findings to the precincts, adjusting to when and where the people are. They continue their collaboration with neighborhood groups and city agencies to provide holistic government service to the citizenry. Setting

meeting between the precinct captains and the commissioner. During these meetings, the captains briefed the crime statistics, the targeted areas with the most calls for service ("hot spots") in the precinct, and how the precinct's operations are developed to prevent or react to the problems.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 9.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 14.

⁸⁶ George L. Kelling and Catherine Coles, 153. Homicides declined nationally by 5 percent, while the decline in New York City was 17 percent.

⁸⁷ Howard Safir, "Crime Watch," Online News Hour: Murder Rates Drop, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/january97/murder_1-3.html (accessed January 30, 2011).

the conditions of order maintenance required the police and community working together to be the scanner and radar against disorder. This case shows the requirement for political determination, bureaucratic reorganization, and interagency collaboration. Even when all three are present, open coordination with the public is required and cannot be limited to daytime business hours. Simultaneous action put criminals off balance. Trust developed between at-risk communities and the police. New York continues to assess outcomes of their operations in order to ensure that order is being maintained.

Lowell, MA

Professors Anthony Braga and Brenda Bond from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and Suffolk University completed a study in 2008 that determined the outcomes of implementing Broken Windows in unstable urban areas within Massachusetts called "Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial." They successfully tested the impact of the Broken Windows approach to community crime prevention through simultaneity and coordination in municipal management and service provision. This study found positive results when simultaneity in agency activity occurred, providing services to citizens in dangerous neighborhoods within Massachusetts. This lent to the perception of government effectiveness within Lowell.

An analysis on the effectiveness of the theory is difficult to conduct because an experiment would require both test and control regions in a municipality where data could be collected on the differences between the two. Within prospective test regions, the techniques espoused in the Broken Windows approach must be implemented independently of any other public policy changes in order to attain the most accurate results possible a social study can provide. In 2005, Professors Anthony Braga and Brenda Bond were able to do this. Their findings differ from the implementation of Broken Windows policing in New York.

Lowell is the fourth largest city within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with a population of 105,000. This city is home to a diverse population with a high unemployment rate, high poverty rate, and low levels of educational attainment. Braga and Bond split the city into 34 "hot spots" using qualitative data provided by the Lowell Police Department (LPD). They were paired off into control and test groups.

Within the control groups, current practices were maintained. However, within the 17 test groups, the LPD implemented broad treatment plans for a period of one year. The changes the LPD made included coordinating with partner municipal agencies to police disorder through “problem oriented policing.”⁸⁸ The techniques utilized combined all municipal agencies. The changes made include the aggressive cleaning and securing of vacant lots, razing of abandoned building, improving street lighting, adding video surveillance, and performing code inspections of disorderly taverns. There were repeated foot patrols by the LPD with increased misdemeanor arrests, dispersion of loiterers, and “stop and frisks” of suspicious persons. There was also an increase in social services to those suffering from mental health problems. Lowell’s leadership reached out to local shelters to remove homeless from neighborhood streets. Lowell’s government increased recreational opportunities in area parks for children. These operations were not a strict police department only approach, but a holistic government engagement with problem areas. The control areas kept current practices of the police department and municipal government in place: routine follow-up and arbitrary vehicular patrols.⁸⁹

The results of the study show three key operational elements for public managers in failing communities to consider. First, this study utilized specifically targeted hot spots to focus intense service provision. Broadly implemented and unfocused service provision will not be able to provide the crime-control and order maintenance required to take back failing communities.⁹⁰ Second, policing managers had difficulty acquiring performance measurement and accountability systems due to difficulty in motivating line-level officers to change their approaches toward policing.⁹¹ Third, and most important, the strongest crime-prevention benefits were provided by changing the physical environment in order to prevent potential offenders from coming to areas to conduct their operations against a given community. Through razing abandoned buildings, improving surveillance through consistent foot patrols and video, improving the conditions of public structures such as streetlights and parks; the opportunity for potential

⁸⁸ Anthony A. Braga and Brenda Bond, 584.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 585-586.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 599.

⁹¹ Ibid, 599.

offenders to conduct crimes is reduced.⁹² These results showed statistically significant impacts from the holistic collaboration between and amongst municipal agencies, the LPD, and citizenry. “All indicators experienced noteworthy reductions in the treatment places relative to the control places.”⁹³

Professor Brenda Bond believes in focusing interagency solutions through better understanding based on hard evidence. This information is compiled through situational interventions to modify disorderly conditions with the target of eliminating problems before they become crimes. Security forces can build relationships with distrustful communities through outreach to special community liaisons. These are the same brokers discussed earlier. They are the people that at risk and distrustful communities already trust and whom police can build a relationship with. This allows that community. Brokers can be found in churches, hospitals, or nonprofit organizations. Success within these communities is assessed by tracking the number of calls for services from them. Police departments are part of a municipality and are partnered with the other agencies within that body of government. Proactive engagements between agencies build a solid foundation for relationships built on respect. Trust shows when the challenged communities begin to contact the differing government agencies for support. Regularly working together to attain a shared understanding of roles within the community as well as joint development of tangible outcomes drive successful interagency collaboration.⁹⁴

The study discovered that it was not only a security force that brings changes to at risk and failing communities. Trust is built by the police within communities through the stable relationships built when there is coproduction of situational strategies that deal with community disorder.⁹⁵ By targeting select regions, collaborative relationships were built and community perceptions changed. The amount of risk for potential criminals increased with the changed perception due to greater intelligence sharing with the LPD. There was less opportunity due to an improved physical environment: trash removed, public infrastructure repaired, and the graffiti cleaned. Criminals and gangs no longer claimed the right to

⁹² Ibid, 599-600.

⁹³ Ibid, 598.

⁹⁴ Brenda Bond Interview. (November 23, 2010).

⁹⁵ Anthony A. Braga and Brenda Bond, 600.

govern in these regions because of the combined team of community, nonprofit social organizations, and governance bureaucratic. Professors Braga and Bond motivated administrative structures within Lowell to chart courses through administrative challenges that are inherently present in municipal government. The bureaucracies provided value by integrating service provision and removing stove pipes.⁹⁶

There are differences between the Lowell model and the model expressed by Wilson and Kelling. Both models ask for a proactive police force to work within targeted communities. Where the two diverge is in how situational interventions occur. Wilson and Kelling have more focus on police alone deterring violence through misdemeanor arrests to remove the personnel who create fear within a community: the homeless, drunkard, or gang member. Braga and Bond's study provides a quantitative experimental implementation of an expanded Broken Windows theory that has holistic situational interventions by all elements of a city government teamed with community nonprofits. Less focus is on the police, but on an entire targeted environment, or hot spot. In a diverse city that has multiple failing communities that suffer from high amounts of criminal violence, the police cannot be everywhere at once. If the police are seen as too aggressive in applying random searches, more likely than not, they will be seen as discriminatory towards poor people and people with different racial backgrounds to that of the police.⁹⁷ However, when the Braga and Bond model was implemented their holistic techniques for a year, there was a 20 percent reduction in calls to police.⁹⁸

The Braga and Bond study did not simply study the effects of community policing on Lowell. It studied how a municipality can maximize the perception of government effectiveness in denying criminal opportunity. They did this through holding all departments affecting a municipality accountable in reducing disorder and how simultaneous interagency activity can reduce disorder. Simultaneous activity

⁹⁶ Gianakis and McCue, 65,69. As discussed earlier, the element of simultaneity is contradictory to the traditional competition that agencies have within a municipality.

⁹⁷ Anita Bernstein, "Civil Rights Violations = Broken Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex," *Florida Law Review* 62, no. 4 (October 2010): 895-950. 907.

⁹⁸ Boston Globe, "Cleaning up Crime in Lowell," *Boston Globe*, February 13, 2009.
<http://lumen.cgsccarl.com/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/pqdweb?did=1644797871&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientId=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD> (accessed December 8, 2010).

creates a perception that a governing body cares about the law abiding citizens that have felt captive in their own homes while criminals have control of the streets. The use of the Department of Public works, for example, to clean graffiti and fix street lamps in tandem with police patrolmen walking the streets deters potential criminals from destroying public property. The concept can be applied to the United States' stability operations abroad.

USG agencies can learn from the information provided by the successful application of the Braga and Bond model. USG agencies abroad already have doctrine that call for holistic operations, but they are not linked by an overarching strategy. Teams of host nation forces working with USG elements can target known "hot spots" and conduct holistic situational interventions. This teamwork can bring the total force of host nation and USG resources to bear on the "hot spots". Through a coproduced plan of action between host government forces, the targeted environment's community, and USG elements; overwhelming presence and service provision will provide the perception in the targeted community that the host nation force can provide the services required of that community. Host nation agencies gain the perception of effectiveness through their performance with support of the USG. Integrity is developed through transparency and following through on promises. Targeted populations will feel comfortable in defining order with a legitimate partner who has their interests in mind as opposed to aligning with a form of criminal organization.

The New Way Forward

Between 2003 and 2006, militias backed by particular tribal, political, and religious groups infiltrated neighborhoods within Baghdad and other major cities within Iraq. The following is an example of militia activity within the neighborhood of Saydia in Baghdad:

"First, militias first undermine basic services, conduct terrorism and utilize extensive inflammatory propaganda to drive away the unwanted demographic. Secondly, the militia will facilitate the repopulation of the contested area with a demographic sympathetic to its goals. This "desired" population will enjoy a restoration of basic services, for a fee to finance future operations. Meanwhile, the militia will utilize a deadly weapon system in an attempt to limit US combat power and demonstrate military potency to the local population. Thirdly, the militia will infiltrate any local national security force to facilitate and

legitimize their actions. Finally, throughout the duration of these activities the militia will offer or impose its own brand of physical security on its base of support.”⁹⁹

Simultaneously, American forces were consolidating onto large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) outside of large cities. “Working on the theory that the US military presence was an irritant to Iraqi society; the generals were trying to oversee a transition to Iraqi forces and so wanted an ever-shrinking American ‘footprint’.”¹⁰⁰ American forces were consolidating in preparation for a complete transfer of responsibility from American forces to Iraqi forces. “The top priority of US Forces for years had been handing [the mission] off to Iraqi forces.”¹⁰¹

There were two examples of success during this time period that would prove to have strategic implications. The first was under the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment (3D ACR) within Tal Afar, Nineveh Province in 2005. COL H.R. McMaster cleared the entire city of Tal Afar with a massive offensive in the late summer of 2005 after nearly four months of preparatory moves. He then established twenty-nine small bases throughout the city that, with regular patrolling, provided American and Iraqi forces a view of every major stretch of road in town. The constant presence and observation made it difficult for insurgents to plant bombs. The bases also provided great agility to respond to enemy contact through multiple avenues. This freedom to respond from 2-3 small bases removed the previous predictability of American offensive actions coming from the singular Forward Operating Base. The most important aspect of providing the constant presence was through the shared respect and understanding that living within a community provides. Both Iraqis and Americans became partners in providing security, learning from each other.¹⁰²

The second was under 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division (1BDE, 1AD) in Ramadi, Al Anbar Province in 2006. Following the example of the 3D ACR in Tal Afar, COL Sean MacFarland began to

⁹⁹ Michael Comstock, “The Battle For Saydia: An Ongoing Case Study On Militia Based Insurgency,” *Small Wars Journal*, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/51-comstock.pdf> (accessed March 7, 2011), 1-2.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2009), 61.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 133.

¹⁰² Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2007), 422-423.

establish small bases throughout the city of Ramadi. Through combined Special Operations sniper teams and “route clearance” roadside bomb clearance, Soldiers and Marines occupied buildings and built combat outposts overnight. COL MacFarland ensured that American and Iraqi forces lived and ate side by side; where Americans learned about Iraqi culture and the Iraqis learn tactics and weapons maintenance. With a total of eighteen combat outposts, there was no predictability to American patrolling due to a constant presence in disputed neighborhoods. The main rule that COL MacFarland had was that once an outpost was established, it would never be given up. 1BDE, 1AD established Iraqi Police stations across the outskirts of Ramadi made from recruits from within town who had a direct interest in protecting their communities from irreconcilable enemy combatants. Through partnerships, community involvement, and constant community presence Ramadi no longer was a strong hold for militia activity. Security directly affected politics within Ramadi, where civilian leaders felt confident to conduct their business and improved the climate between tribal and provincial government leadership.¹⁰³

In January of 2007, President George W. Bush announced a new strategy for American forces within Iraq. He committed 20,000 extra troops to fulfill the strategy called “The New Way Forward”, or more popularly known as the Surge. The strategy called for the reorganization of the US forces to focus on providing sustainable population security through changing how units will be deployed and employed throughout Iraq, with a focus on Baghdad. Learning from the experiences in Ramadi and Tal Afar, coalition forces established new Joint Security Stations (JSS) and Combat Outposts (COP) where security forces lived and worked from throughout every major population center throughout Iraq. The new strategy was considered a complete reversal of how most US forces had operated in the first years of the war.¹⁰⁴ Some of the key tenets that were being taught to incoming commanders were:

- “Secure the people where they sleep.”
- “Never leave home without an Iraqi.”
- “Look beyond the IED: get the network that placed it.”
- “Give the people justice and honor We talk about democracy and human rights. Iraqis talk about justice and honor.”

¹⁰³ Thomas E. Ricks. *The Gamble*, 65-68.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 140.

- “Get out and walk” – that is, “patrol on foot.”¹⁰⁵

These rules increased the capability of American forces to build integrity with the Iraqi people and the Government of Iraq. By conducting foot patrols, neighborhoods became familiar and all security forces became members of the community. American and Iraqi security forces integrated with the population. When explaining the tactics of the surge, General David Petraeus said, “The only way to secure a population is to live with it – you can’t commute to this fight.”¹⁰⁶

The reconsolidation of forces into the smaller JSS and COP locations was due to the belief that the local population would be protected by the forces living directly within the neighborhoods. In Baghdad, this began with Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, also referred as the Baghdad Security Plan. With the crux of the surge forces focused on Baghdad, American forces were combined with Iraqi forces within the neighborhood blocks. Iraqi Police from the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi Army from the Ministry of Defense were working towards the same strategy. Holistic Iraqi forces coordinating operations with American forces cleared neighborhoods, block by block. Then they retained the neighborhoods by providing a twenty four hour presence.¹⁰⁷ With the full time presence in place, the other ministries of the Iraqi government can work with the municipal leadership to plan and lead development in communities. Due to this security, small business leaders reinvigorated employment opportunities within these neighborhoods through opening store fronts and leading both capital and small scale construction projects to continue sustainable growth. These principles outlined the “clear, hold, build” strategy that was taken from the ideas expressed by COLs McMaster and MacFarland.

Prior to initiating the Surge, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive – 44 in December of 2005. This Directive states that all USG efforts from the various US Departments and Agencies with relevant foreign policy capabilities and expertise will be coordinated under a single strategy. It was designed to “promote the security of the US through improved coordination, planning,

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. 140-141.

¹⁰⁶ Catherine Dale, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues For Congress,” U.S. Congressional Research Service, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf> (accessed February 1, 2011). 72.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 74.

and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”¹⁰⁸ With implementation in Iraq, the USG coordinated the expertise under the auspices of the US Department of State (DoS) through the development of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs were viewed by the DoS as a platform from which to promote a spectrum of US interests, including counter-terrorism, social and political moderation, regional stability, and narcotics eradication. DoS managed Iraq PRTs and coordinated their operations through the US Embassy Baghdad. Each Iraq PRT was led by a DoS Foreign Service Officer (FSO).¹⁰⁹ These teams were comprised of experts from the array of the executive branch to collaborate with Iraqi government officials in the realm of redeveloping their country during stabilization operations. They partnered with the military forces that were arrayed throughout the country, basing themselves from the FOBs, but operating from JSSs and COPs. By raising stability operations to the same level of importance as offensive and defensive operations through DODD 3000.05, the PRTs were able to provide key expertise and capabilities for rebuilding the civil society of Iraq. Team members partnered Iraqi with business and civilian government leaders. The Surge allowed for greater use of the USG’s interagency capabilities by employing their resources at the neighborhood level, where municipal and provincial policies could be developed under the umbrella the JSSs and COPs provided.

Through partnership, coordination, and collaboration across the spectrum of both the United States and Iraqi governments created an atmosphere where simultaneity of effort could occur. The reorganization of American and Iraqi forces throughout Iraq according to the strategy outlined by COLs McMaster and MacFarland were based on the basic principles of counterinsurgency. They also have Broken Windows-like tenets. The deployment of civilian and military forces to neighborhoods throughout Iraq enabled civil society, business, and security experts to directly collaborate with Iraqi

¹⁰⁸ George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive / NSPD 44,” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html> (accessed February 27, 2011).

¹⁰⁹ Nima Abbaszadeh et al., “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations,” Princeton University, http://www.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/www591b.pdf (accessed March 16, 2011). 48.

counterparts in government, military, and business. Simultaneous application of offensive, defensive, and stability operations across all agencies combined shock and relief to the targeted populations. Their constant presence allowed security forces to understand the environments they were operating in with greater clarity. The regularity of the security presence fostered community solutions with security and civil society leaders working out difference. Joint community problem solving then removed the threats of the insurgent population by removing the opportunity to operate through information sharing. Trust developed between the security forces and the community.

United Nations Mission in Sudan

In 2005, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established because the civil war there “constituted a threat to international peace and security.”¹¹⁰ UNMIS’s mandate was to promote the rule-of-law through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of contributing to long-term peace and stability.¹¹¹ This section will discuss how the international security forces under UNMIS conducted stability operations after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005.¹¹²

The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement broke down in 1983 when the then-president Gaafar Nimeiry imposed Shari’a, effectively removing the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region that ended the first civil war. From 1983 to 2005, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) fought with the government over resources, power, the role of religion, and self-determination with the results of over two million people dead, 4 million internally displaced people (IDP), and over 600,000 refugees.¹¹³ The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 had the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A had provisions on security arrangements, power-sharing, autonomy, and equitable distribution of economic resources.¹¹⁴ By September of 2006, UNMIS military and police components numbered

¹¹⁰ United Nations Security Council, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005).” [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1590\(2005\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1590(2005)). (Accessed February 2, 2011).

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Although there are multiple issues within Sudan that address the January 2011 referendum on independence for Southern Sudan, the Crisis in Darfur, and civil society; they are outside the purview of this study.

¹¹³ United Nation Mission in the Sudan. “UNMIS Background.” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml>. (Accessed February 2, 2011).

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

close to 10,000 personnel: split into military troops, observers, staff officers, and police officers.¹¹⁵

UNMIS became the lead international element to conduct oversight of the post conflict transformation of the Sudan in partnership with elements of the African Union.

The UNMIS operations in the Sudan had a rocky start. Their mandate consisted of four broad components: support the implementation of the CPA; coordinate and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons; assist the mine-action sector; and protect and promote human rights.¹¹⁶ However, with such an important mandate, their deployment into country was incremental and took nearly two years.¹¹⁷ There were also territorial restrictions placed onto the UNMIS by both the GoS and the SPLM/A, and later the Government of Southern Sudan.¹¹⁸ This created a weak perception of the UNMIS because it was incapable of fielding forces to support their mission set. UNMIS forces were not always taken seriously because of the limits on their mandates, leaving them with no means to conduct operations against violators of the CPA.¹¹⁹ Interference by both the northern and southern governments prevented UNMIS from carrying out the important mandate of protecting civilian populations.

There were also internal organizational problems that hampered the UNMIS. The mission acted as if there were no other NGOs or previous UN missions working in the Sudan. There were many lessons and initiatives already in existence to build on that were scrapped upon the arrival of UNMIS. For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) had a developed plan and local partners to implement a disarmament program. The UNMIS sidetracked the UNDP program and implemented its own strategy from scratch.¹²⁰ Through multiple issues, the UNMIS was hampered in its capacity to partner with host nation security forces, local officials, and NGOs. This lack of partnership and integration of resources and capabilities creates a competitive atmosphere in an already hostile

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Jaïr van der Lijn, "Factors For Success and Failure of Un Peacekeeping Operations: Theory and the Case of Unmis in Sudan," Human Security Report Project, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ISA_factorsforsuccessandfailureUNPKO.pdf (accessed March 14, 2011), 6.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 16.

¹¹⁸ Maggie Fick, "UN Docs: S. Sudan Asks UN to Avoid Battle Areas," Washington Post, March 11, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031102920_pf.html (accessed March 16, 2011).

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 11.

¹²⁰ Jaïr van der Lijn. 18.

environment. This lack of cohesion and tampering increases the threat level and could spark a return to conflict.

There were some aspects of the UNMIS that were successful, however. The UNMIS police training program was designed to reform and restructure the Sudanese Police Service, train Sudanese policemen, and evaluate their progress. The UNMIS implemented a mentoring and capacity building program for the Sudanese police force. They did not have a mandate to act as the police force.¹²¹ The mission of the UNMIS police training was as follows: “UNMIS Police shall significantly facilitate the transformation of Sudan Police into a professional, efficient, community-oriented police service capable of ensuring safety and security of the common citizen of Sudan.”¹²² In both the Southern Sudan Police Service and the Popular Police forces within the IDP camps of northern Sudan, UNMIS forces collocated with police units to conduct training and mentoring. The community-oriented policing training became important due to the vast array of religious groups, tribes, and ethnicities inside the country. It also attempted to fill serious gaps between the varying concepts of public security and the role of law enforcement, security, and military officials.¹²³ Community policing requires three central commitments by the policing organization executing it: citizen involvement, problem solving, and decentralization.¹²⁴ UNMIS forces teamed with UNDP and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund to coordinate a joint approach to training the police forces. The police training efforts of the differing international organizations working together were seen as sustainable in Sudan.¹²⁵

There were ample opportunities to have collaboration between the differing sectors of the security establishment with civil society. Unfortunately, UNMIS showed that it squandered multiple opportunities to integrate itself with legacy organizations in the country to form a unified international presence that

¹²¹ United Nations Mission in Sudan. “UNMIS Police Fact Sheet,” United Nations, <http://unmis.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=64j6f6eAmEo%3d&tabid=567> (accessed February 2, 2011).

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ United States Institute of Peace. “Progress in Peacebuilding.” <http://www.usip.org/publications/sudan-progress-in-peacebuilding>, (Accessed February 2, 2011), 3.

¹²⁴ Wesley G. Skogan, “An Overview of Community Policing: Origins, Concepts, and Implementation,” in *The Handbook of Knowledge Based Policing: Current Conceptions and Future Directions*, ed. Dr. Tom Williamson (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley, 2008), 44.

¹²⁵ Jaïr van der Lijn. 18.

could holistically conduct joint operations together. Their decision to follow the restrictions placed on them by the host nation forces directly impacted their mandated mission to protect civilians.¹²⁶ This effort lacked the integration of military forces required to affect the population's perception of both the international and host nations' intentions and capabilities.

The police training program that was implemented in the northern and southern regions of the Sudan by UNMIS used Broken Windows theory within an area struggling with post conflict reconstruction. Because the community policing model was trained by an integrated international team of UNMIS police trainers, their efforts were seen as largely successful and sustainable. There was a perception of organization that builds confidence in the trainees to conduct their jobs in accordance with their new skill sets. Sudanese police forces incorporated themselves into the communities they are meant to secure in order to solve minor problems prior to judicial involvement. With security forces present in the community, criminal activity is actively deterred through their presence. Unfortunately, these results do not translate across the entire UNMIS mandate. There was little simultaneity across the spectrum of operations due to incremental implementation and distrust between the Sudanese and UNMIS.

Conclusion

USG civilian and military agencies already have doctrine that calls for holistic operations. However, that doctrine is not linked by an overarching strategy. The Broken Windows model has been successful in reclaiming territory from criminal elements in American cities by deterring gang activities. Simultaneously applying shock and relief removes the initiative from both criminal and insurgent elements within a society. This monograph linked insurgency with criminal activity. If clearly integrated into stability operations, the Broken Windows model offers clear guidance on policy by focusing efforts on deterring insurgent activities.

This monograph studied what the Broken Windows theory is and some examples of how it has been applied in the United States. In New York City, there was greater emphasis on collaboration

¹²⁶ Maggie Fick, "UN Docs: S. Sudan Asks Un to Avoid Battle Areas," *Washington Post*, March 11, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031102920_pf.html (accessed March 14, 2011).

between law enforcement elements to regain order on the streets. They used political determination, bureaucratic reorganization, and interagency collaboration. The political determination led the city through the initial public outcry that developed over increasing police enforcement of disorder. The reorganization of police forces resulted in decentralized authority and empowered police officers, giving lower level managers the discretion to make decisions. This changed the organizational culture from one that was exclusive to one that is inclusive. Information sharing and collaboration became the norm, not the exception. Interagency collaboration led to increasing quality-of-life improvements through remedying and removing the visible signs of disorder. Parks became usable and transportation became safer. Throughout all this, New York City police officers were on the streets helping to involve local communities in determining a new definition of order that reflected the particulars of the neighborhood. Simultaneous activity built trust. Trust developed between communities and the police because they perceived a reliable partner.

In Lowell, collaborative relationships developed and community perceptions changed. There was still an increase in police enforcement of disorderly activity. However, Lowell simultaneously used all elements of city government in conjunction with non-profit organizations to focus on particular regions. In New York, the focus was on the NYPD. In Lowell, the entire municipal government was held accountable for reducing signs of disorder. This maximized the perception of government effectiveness in denying criminal opportunity through holding all interagency partners accountable in restoring order, simultaneously. Holistic situational interventions removed criminal opportunity to create fear. Citizens felt trust in their community and integrity developed.

Within Iraq, a similar dynamic emerged. Civilian and military forces deployed to neighborhoods and began to be seen as a constant and trustworthy security presence. This allowed security forces to become members of the community. The deployment of civil society, governance, and business experts to regions throughout Iraq increased the capacity of Iraqi leaders to better serve their constituencies. Simultaneous application of offensive, defensive, and stability operations across all agencies combined shock and relief to the targeted populations. Joint community problem-solving helped remove key threats

to the population by limiting the opportunities insurgents had to operate. Simultaneous action built trust between the population and security forces.

In Sudan, the inability of UNMIS to use the lessons of community policing they imparted on their Sudanese counterparts hindered their operations. The community policing being taught by the UNMIS to their Sudanese counterparts centered on three tenets: citizen involvement, problem solving, and decentralization. UNMIS showed that it squandered multiple opportunities to integrate itself successfully with legacy organizations within the country. As a result, the mission failed to form a unified presence that could conduct joint operations together. This effort lacked the integration of military forces required to affect the population's perception of both the international and host nations' intentions and capabilities. There was little simultaneity across UNMIS operations. This hindered the development of trust.

Instability and disorder deprive people of a quality of life that an active community provides. The examples of Lowell and Iraq show that holistic operations across the spectrums of government and community provide environmental, physical, and emotional deterrents to crime and terrorism. Through presence, partnership, and quick service delivery; crime and gang violence are reduced and order is restored. Due to the link between crime, gangs, and terrorism; applying the Broken Windows model is recommended when conducting stability operations in post conflict transformation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abbaszadeh, Nima, Mark Crow, Marianne El-Khoury, Jonathan Gandomi, David Kuwayama, Christopher MacPherson, Meghan Nutting, Nealin Parker, and Taya Weiss. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations." Princeton University. http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591b.pdf (accessed March 16, 2011).
- Bernstein, Anita. "Civil Rights Violations = Broken Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex." *Florida Law Review* 62, no. 4 (October 2010): 895-950.
- Braga, Anthony A., and Brenda Bond. "Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial." *Criminology* 46, no. 3 (September 2008): 577-607. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2008.00124.x> (accessed August 4, 2010).
- Bratton, William J. "Cutting Crime and Restoring Order: What America Can Learn from New York's Finest." The Heritage Foundation. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/HL573nbsp-Cutting-Crime-and-Restoring-Order> (accessed January 30, 2011).
- Bullard, Robert. "Military Pacification." *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* 46, no. 163 (January - February 1910).
- Bush, George W. "National Security Presidential Directive / NSPD 44." Federation of American Scientists. <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html> (accessed February 27, 2011).
- Comstock, Michael. "The Battle For Saydia: An Ongoing Case Study On Militia Based Insurgency." *Small Wars Journal*. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/51-comstock.pdf> (accessed March 7, 2011).
- Dale, Catherine. "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues For Congress." U.S. Congressional Research Service. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf> (accessed February 1, 2011).
- Diamond, Louise. "Conflict Resolution Terminology." Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. http://imtd.server295.com/?page_id=647 (accessed November 30, 2010).
- Gianakis, Gerasimos A., Clifford McCue, and Clifford P. McCue. *Local Government Budgeting*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999.
- Harcourt, Bernard E. *Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Harcourt, Bernard, and Jens Ludwig. "Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment." *University of Chicago Law Review* (Winter, 2006): 271-320. <http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/ludwigj/publication-18261.pdf> (accessed December 11, 2010).
- Haussler, Nicholas I. "Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. In Air University, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/haussler_gangs_iraq.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).

- Kelling, George L., Anthony Pate, Amy Ferrara, Mary Utne, and Charles E. Brown. "The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment." Police Foundation. <http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/newark.html> (accessed December 8, 2010).
- Kelling, George L., and Catherine M. Coles. *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities*. New York, NY: Free Press, 1996.
- Kelling, George L., and James Q. Wilson. "The Police and Neighborhood Safety." *The Atlantic Magazine*, March 1982.
- Lipsky, Michael. *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service*, 30th Anniversary Expanded Edition. 30 Anv Exp ed. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010.
- Manwaring, Max G. "Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency." Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB597.pdf> (accessed December 8, 2010).
- Notter, James. "Occasional Paper: Trust and Conflict Transformation." Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. http://imtd.server295.com/?page_id=347 (accessed November 30, 2010).
- Obama, Barack. "2010 National Security Strategy." The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed December 13, 2010).
- Pollard, Charles, ed. "Zero Tolerance: Short-term Fix, Long-term Liability?" In *Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society (Choice in Welfare, No 35)*. 2 ed. Edited by Norman Dennis. London: Coronet Books, 1998.
- Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005*. 1st ed. New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2007.
- Ricks, Thomas E. *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*. 1st ed. New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2009.
- Safir, Howard. "Crime Watch." Online News Hour: Murder Rates Drop. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/january97/murder_1-3.html (accessed January 30, 2011).
- Skogan, Wesley G. "An Overview of Community Policing: Origins, Concepts, and Implementation." In *The Handbook of Knowledge Based Policing: Current Conceptions and Future Directions*. Edited by Dr. Tom Williamson. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley, 2008.
- Skogan, Wesley G. "Broken Windows: Why - and How - We Should Take Them Seriously." *Criminology and Public Policy* 7, no. 2 (May 2008).
- Skogan, Wesley G. "Disorder, Crime and Community Decline." In Tim Hope and Margaret Shaw (eds.) *Communities and Crime Reduction*. London: HMSO, 1988.
- Skogan, Wesley G, Susan M. Hartnett, Jennifer T. Comey, Jill Dubois, Marianne Kaiser, Lovig Lovig, and Jennifer Comey. *On the Beat: Police and Community Problem-Solving*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

- Sullivan, John P. "Transnational Gangs: The Impact of Third Generation Gangs in Central America." *Air and Space Power Journal*. <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2008/2tri08/sullivaneng.htm#Sullivan> (accessed December 8, 2010).
- United Nations Mission in the Sudan. "UNMIS Background." United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml>. (Accessed February 2, 2011).
- United Nations Mission in Sudan. "UNMIS Police Fact Sheet," United Nations, <http://unmis.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=64j6f6eAmEo%3d&tabid=567> (accessed February 2, 2011).
- United Nations Security Council. "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005)." United Nations. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1590\(2005\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1590(2005)) (accessed February 2, 2011).
- United States Department of Defense. *Department of Defense Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 28, 2005.
- United States Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, April 12, 2001 (As Amended Through September 30, 2010).
- United States Department of Defense, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations*. Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, February 2008.
- United States Department of Defense, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations*. Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, October 2008.
- United States Department of Defense, *U.S. Army Field Manual 6-0: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*. Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, August 2003.
- United States Department of Defense, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*. Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, December 2006.
- United States Department of Defense, *U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process*. Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, March 2010.
- United States Department of Justice, *Community Policing Defined*. Washington, DC: Community Oriented Policing Services, 2009.
- United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. "Principles of the USG Planning Framework For Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation." Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. <http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=49Q9> (accessed February 26, 2011).
- United States Institute of Peace. "Progress in Peacebuilding." <http://www.usip.org/publications/sudan-progress-in-peacebuilding>, (Accessed February 2, 2011).

- United States Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009.
- van der Lijn, Jaïr. "Factors For Success and Failure of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Theory and the Case of UNMIS in Sudan." Human Security Report Project. http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ISA_factorsforsuccessandfailureUNPKO.pdf (accessed March 14, 2011).
- Wilson, James Q. *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.